MDLEA’s Section 70503(a)(3) makes it illegal for an individual to “knowingly or intentionally … conceal, or attempt or conspire to conceal, more than $100,000 in currency … aboard the covered vessel if that vessel is outfitted for smuggling.” But what does it mean for a vessel to be “outfitted for smuggling[?]” A recent District Court for the District of Virgin Islands decision in U.S. v. Lebron Pinto, et al., No. 3:21-CR-0009, 2023 WL 6160085 (D.V.I. Sept. 21, 2023) provides persuasive guidance relying on the ordinary meanings of the terms “outfitted” and “smuggling” to allow four defendants’ MDLEA indictments to survive motions to dismiss.
The facts of U.S. v. Lebron Pinto are different than most “drugs on a boat” cases we review on MDLEA.com so I am going to go into a bit more detail than usual. On 7 April 2021, Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Air and Marine Operations agents were patrolling Stumpy Beach in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, when they observed a silver Ford Explorer passing with dark tinted windows. During the patrol at the beach area, an unknown male emerged from the bushes, talking on his cellphone, and appeared to be nervous upon seeing the agents. The occupant of a silver Ford Explorer drove near the beach, approached the unknown individual, and they started talking to each other.
At approximately 1905 hours, the agents observed a wake in the ocean, heard a boat engine in the beach area, and notified other team members that a vessel traveling without navigating lights was in the Stumpy Beach area. After the vessel approached the area, the silver Ford Explorer was observed traveling from the beach area to the main road where the agents signaled the driver to stop. The driver saw the law enforcement lights and attempted to escape, but the vehicle became stuck in the dirt. The driver then exited the vehicle and ran into nearby bushes. The agents approached the silver Ford Explorer and observed three large black bags in the trunk of the vehicle, which contained over $1,200,000.00 USD. Meanwhile, the agents who were notified of the wake and engine noise, observed that a blue center console vessel was beached on Stumpy Beach.
More agents were called and the defendants were eventually found, arrested, and interviewed. During the interviews, one of the defendants provided incriminating evidence that he departed Fajardo, Puerto Rico with two other defendants and was paid to pick up a large amount of money in St. Thomas. Upon approaching St. Thomas, they were signaled by someone on land at the Stumpy Beach to enter, but the vessel became stuck in the sand at the beach and they never received the money.
The defendants were indicted for violations of 70503(a)(3) in that they knowingly or intentionally concealed and conspired to conceal more than $100,000 in currency aboard a covered vessel that was outfitted for smuggling. Defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that “[t]he requirement that the ‘vessel is outfitted for smuggling’ is unconstitutionally vague.” However, the court did not agree.
With respect to the facial challenge to Section 70503(a)(3), the court noted that the “MDLEA does not define the term ‘outfitted’ nor does it define the term ‘smuggling.’” As such, it relied on the “ordinary meaning” of each term taken from the dictionary:
The Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary provides an adequate foundation for the meaning of the words “outfitted for smuggling” as commonly understood by people of ordinary intelligence at the time of Section 70503(a)(3)’s enactment. The relevant ordinary meaning of the disputed words in this case is found in the first senses of the verb “outfit” (“to furnish with an outfit”), the noun “outfit” (“the act of fitting out or equipping (as for a voyage or expedition)”) and the verb “smuggle” (“to import or export secretly contrary to the law and esp. without paying duties imposed by law”).
U.S. v. Lebron Pinto, et al., 2023 WL 6160085, at *5. Accordingly, the court held, “the ordinary meaning of Section 70503(a)(3)’s language ‘vessel is outfitted for smuggling’ gives sufficient notice to people of ordinary intelligence of the conduct Section 70503(a)(3) prohibits[]” and “there is no basis for any level of specificity with respect to those words.”
In regard to the evidence the government told the court it intends to produce demonstrating that the “vessel [was] outfitted for smuggling[,]” the court noted, among other things, that “the defendant’s vessel was equipped with four spare batteries, several of which were automotive batteries, which were not in use (in addition to those four batteries, the boat was equipped with two other batteries, which were in use).” Additionally, “[a]t trial, the Government’s witness will testify that these types of batteries are commonly used by smugglers to anchor contraband in the event that the smugglers are caught.” U.S. v. Lebron Pinto, et al., 2023 WL 6160085, at *4.
Why is this important? Because you can find this type of evidence all over reports of investigations (ROI) and CG case packages! How many times have you seen: “30ft, blue Ecuadorian panga with 2 outboard engines, black tarp covered objects in the front half of the panga?” Or how about descriptions including: “30’ cigarette style go-fast vessel with two 300 HP Yamaha outboard engines,” “transiting without navigation lights at night,” “multiple gas cans,” “visible packages consistent with bales,” or even—one of my favorites— “fishing gear, but no fish or fish hold?” Assuming that the government has a witness who can testify that these characteristics are indicative of a drug venture, then you have a vessel “outfitted for smuggling” in a MDLEA case.